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" W H O IS GOING TO REFORM THE REFORMERS?" 
THE COORDINATION 
OF THE GREEK NATIONAL REFORM PROGRAMMES 
George Andreou 
The article studies the impact of the revised Lisbon Strategy -and the National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) in particular- on the EU policy coordination of Greece. It is argued 
that the structures and processes established for the formulation and monitoring of the 
NRPs reflect some deep-rooted characteristics of the Greek system of governance, namely 
centralism, politicization, informality and reliance on actors. It is also found that the de­
mise of this policy network was caused not by domestic factors or developments, but by 
the insistence of Greece's EU partners to fuse the implementation of the Greek NRP with 
the execution of the 2010 economic adjustment programme. The introduction of this 
process of coercive-direct Europeanization in Greece (as well as in Ireland and Portugal) 
signals, inter alia, the emergence of a two-speed "Europe 2020". On the other hand, the 
new reform coordination process in Greece relies on preexisting structures and processes 
that closely follow traditional patterns. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The national co-ordination of EU issues has always been a challenge for mem­
ber states, forcing them to deal with multiple policy areas cutting across dif­
ferent organizational boundaries at the national level. The Lisbon Strategy has 
increased significantly that challenge, as its ambition to address complex 
problems (associated with the improvement of the European competitiveness) 
has expanded the number of policy areas member states need to co-ordinate. 
On top of that, the nature of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) 
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used in the Lisbon Strategy defies the dominance oflegislation as policy tool.1 
In institutional terms, "Lisbon" does not constitute a policy space, but a gover-
nance architecture: a strategic and long-term institutional arrangement ad-
dressing strategic and long-term problems in a holistic manner, setting sub-
stantive output-oriented goals, and being implemented through combinations 
of old and new organizational structures.2 
It can be argued that public policy in Greece -defined by centralization, 
politicization, hierarchical decision-making, poor vertical and horizontal co-
ordination, low levels of policy efficiency and lack of transparency and ac-
countability- exhibits a high degree of misfit with the logic of "Lisbon". The 
launching of National Reform Programmes (NRPs) in 2005 under the re-
formed Lisbon Strategy represented an additional challenge, as it necessitated 
the establishment of a novel coordination mechanism at the national level, 
and, furthermore, added new requirements for policy effectiveness and policy 
coherence. This paper employs an approach inspired by historical institution-
alism in order to study the actors involved and the processes employed in the 
drafting and monitoring of the Greek NRPs; it thus aims to assess the gover-
nance and Europeanization effects of the Lisbon Strategy on the patterns of 
national EU policy co-ordination. In other words, following Bor ras and 
Peters, our goal is to investigate empirically, first, whether there is an impact 
on the organizational structures of national EU policy co-ordination in Greece 
since 2005, and second, if there is change, what characterizes it.3 
The term Europeanization describes processes of constitution, diffusion and 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms. These are first 
defined and consolidated in the context of EU decision-making and then in-
corporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures 
and public policies.4 Drawing on the policy transfer literature, a useful dis-
tinction may be drawn between Europeanization that is voluntary (i.e., em-
1. See S. Borrâs - B. G. Peters, "The Lisbon Strategy's empowerment of core executives: 
centralizing and politicizing EU national co-ordination", Journal of European Public Policy, 
vol. 18, no. 4, 2011, pp. 525-545. 
2. See S. Borrâs - C. Radaelli, "The politics of governance architectures: creation, change 
and effects of the EU Lisbon Strategy", Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 4, 
2011, pp. 463-484. 
3. Ibid. 
4. C. Radaelli, "The Europeanization of public policy", In K. Featherstone - C. Radaelli 
(eds.), The politics of Europeanization, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 30. 
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braced by key domestic actors) and coercive (opposed by key domestic ac­
tors). Again, there may be a distinction here between direct and indirect im­
pacts. Thus, voluntary-direct Europeanization would be the ready adoption of 
EU decisions in a given area; while voluntary-indirect would refer to adapta­
tion of EU preferences and/or practices and/or policies in another area. 
Similarly, coercive-direct Europeanization refers to the compulsory accept­
ance of European preferences and/or practices and/or policies in a given area, 
while coercive-indirect refers to spillover consequences of coercive-direct 
Europeanization in one area to another.5 
When trying to trace the Europeanization effects of an OMC process, our 
knowledge of Europeanization suggests that its impact will be differentiated 
across countries and will depend on factors such as the domestic opportunity 
structure and socialization effects,6 the capacity of state administrations to 
plan and implement the associated reforms, and, more generally, the institu­
tional capacity of the state to respond to external pressures.7 Most of the liter­
ature devoted to the study of co-ordination of EU policies at the national level 
stresses the primacy of the administrative traditions of member states. These 
path dependence findings are also dominant in the Europeanization approach 
on changes in national executives. The strong empirical presence of national 
path dependence indicates that Europeanization does imply neither a homog-
enization of public administrative structures, nor a process towards a "single 
European administration".8 Europeanization is thus treated not as an end-
state, but as a process leading to differentiated outcomes.9 
To explore domestic institutional changes in Greece brought about by the 
5.1. Bache - A. Marshall, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: A Governance Ap­
proach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain", Queen's Papers on Europeanization, No. 5/ 
2004,: Queen's University, Belfast 2004, p. 6, http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPolitics 
International StudiesandPhilosophy/FileStore/EuropeanisationFiles/Filetoupload,38447,en.pdf. 
6. Socialisation may turn "local" domestic policy-makers into "cosmopolitans" who feel 
some sense of belonging to a common European elite. This socialisation effect would enhance 
the impact of peer pressure on domestic policy choices. C. Radaelli, "The Europeanization of 
public policy", op.cit, p. 54. 
7. See V. Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2002. 
8. S. Borrâs - Β. G. Peters, "The Lisbon Strategy's empowerment of core executives: cen­
tralizing and politicizing EU national co-ordination", op.cit., p. 528. 
9. C. Radaelli, "Europeanization: Solution Or Problem?", European Integration Online 
Papers (EioP), vol. 8, no. 16, 2004, pp. 4-5, eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf. 
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NRPs, a governance approach, drawing on the insights and tools of two related 
notions -the core executive and the Centre of Government-, is adopted. 
Most definitions of governance contain the idea that there is wide participa-
tion of public, private and voluntary actors in the policy process. In one sense, 
the governance approach reveals nothing particularly new: central govern-
ment has always depended on other actors in the policy process (particularly 
for policy implementation). It is the degree of interdependence that has 
changed due to the scale of fragmentation and subsequent proliferation of ac-
tors involved in policy-making, whether driven by internal reforms (such as 
privatization and devolution) or external pressures (such as European integra-
tion and globalization).10 
The notion of the core executive was developed in research on central gov-
ernment in the UK and includes all those organizations and structures that 
primarily serve either to combine and integrate central government policies, 
or act as final arbiters within the executive on conflicts between different ele-
ments of the government machine.11 These are usually the Prime Minister's 
Office (PMO) and the set of organizations directly depending on the Prime 
Minister. A similar concept is the one of the Centre of Government; the lat-
ter is defined as a central leadership hub facilitating co-ordination, collabora-
tion and co-operation across the public administration, with the objective of 
securing a strong, coherent and collective strategic vision of where the coun-
try needs to go, and how it will get there.12 Behind both concepts lies the un-
derstanding that central government is not a monolith and that traditional 
domestic concepts of cabinet government and prime ministerial power do not 
provide the tools for us to investigate the interdependence that is at the heart 
of government. This emphasis on disaggregating government and on studying 
the interdependence between formal institutions and informal processes pro-
vides greater sensitivity to understanding the influence of central government 
in mediating the pressures of Europeanization.13 
10. I. Bache, "Europeanization: A Governance Approach", paper presented at the European 
Union Studies Association (EUSA) 8 th International Biennial Conference, Nashville, March 27-
29, 2003, p. 9. 
11. B. Laffan - J. O'Mahony, "Managing Europe from an Irish perspective: critical junc-
tures and the increasing formalization of the core executive In Ireland", Public Administration, 
vol. 85, no. 1,2007, p. 169. 
12. OECD, Greece: Review of the Central Administration, OECD Public Governance 
Reviews, OECD Publishing, 2011, p. 43. 
13.1. Bache, "Europeanization: A Governance Approach", op.cit., p. 10-11. 
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In their attempt to capture the "Lisbon effect" on domestic EU policy co-
ordination, Borrâs and Peters have formulated three different (but interrelated) 
hypotheses. Specifically, they argue that when dealing with Lisbon Strategy 
matters, national executives' coordination institutions exhibit trends towards 
a) centralization, b) politicization and c) path-dependent changes reflecting a 
continuation of pre-existing institutional patterns.14 This paper seeks to ad-
dress these issues in the Greek context. The first section outlines the main in-
struments and procedures of Lisbon and "Europe 2020". A short discussion 
of politico-administrative relations in Greece, with emphasis on the policy co-
ordination dimension, follows. The next section focuses on the governance of 
the three Greek NPRs that have been adopted so far (2005-2008, 2008-2010 
and 2011-2014). In this instance, a very salient question meriting attention is 
whether the -substantial- policy changes triggered by Greece's debt crisis sig-
nify a critical juncture that encourages a break with the past. The last section 
concludes. 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REVISED LISBON STRATEGY 
a. From Lisbon I to Lisbon II 
The original Lisbon Strategy was launched in 2000 as a response to the chal-
lenges of globalization and ageing. The European Council defined the objec-
tive of the strategy for the EU "to become the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010 capable of sustainable eco-
nomic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion and re-
spect for the environment". Five years later, in Spring 2005, judging the re-
sults as "mixed", heads of state and government chose to refocus priorities on 
growth and employment and decided to streamline the Lisbon process. The 
main features of the new process were a longer programming period, a single 
set of Integrated Guidelines, and the preparation by member states of 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs). The essential political choice behind 
these decisions was twofold. First, the failure of the first Lisbon strategy 
(Lisbon I) was attributed neither to its goals nor to its principles, but rather to 
excessive complexity and inadequate process. Second, the lack of political 
14. S. Borrâs - Β. G. Peters, "The Lisbon Strategy's empowerment of core executives: cen­
tralizing and politicizing EU national co-ordination", op.cit., p. 530-531. 
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commitment on the part of member states was considered a major weakness. 
As a result, the revised Lisbon strategy (Lisbon II) put emphasis on national 
ownership and adopted a more diversified, bottom-up approach.15 
Lisbon II was both similar to and different from Lisbon I. It was similar 
because the major aims remained unchanged and because the very rationale of 
a "soft" coordination of national reform policies through the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC) was not questioned. At the same time, it was dif-
ferent because some of the initial objectives were downplayed and because the 
underlying governance model, where the European Commission played the 
role of a schoolmaster, was abandoned in favour of one in which it played the 
role of a coach (the idea was to stop lecturing the member states and to em-
bark on a partnership with them instead).16 The whole procedure was reor-
ganized into three major steps; namely, the definition of a set of European 
Integrated Guidelines, their implementation through three-year National 
Reform Programmes (NRPs) and the monitoring of progress on a country by 
country basis and collectively. The consolidation of Member State responses 
into a single Programme was designed to introduce greater coherence into 
the policy-making process and to make sure that the different agencies and 
levels of governance would act in a more cohesive way in pursuing reform, 
making for a less fragmented political and administrative "ownership" of the 
different policy areas.17 
The Lisbon Strategy's overall impact on the economy and on national re-
form processes has been mixed. Whereas Lisbon managed to create a European 
consensus on reform contents, the delivery gap between commitments and 
actions was not closed. As a matter of fact, Lisbon has failed to deliver on sev-
eral of its ambitious benchmarks and targets. Furthermore, well-performing 
Member States pressed ahead with more ambitious reforms, whilst others 
gradually built up a (sizeable) delivery gap. It is also worth stressing that the 
approach to NRPs differed considerably across Member States, with ambi-
tious and coherent reform agendas for some countries contrasting with vague 
15. See European Commission, "Lisbon Strategy Evaluation Document", SEC (2010) 114 
final, February 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/lisbon_strategy_evaluation_en.pdf. 
16. J. Pisani-Ferry - A. Sapir, "Last Exit to Lisbon", Bruegel Policy Contribution, March 
2006, pp. 1, 5-6, http://www.bruegel.org/download/parent/29-last-exit-to-lisbon/file/385-last-
exit-to-lisbon-english. 
17. K. Armstrong - 1 . Begg - J. Zeitlin, "JCMS Symposium: EU Governance After Lisbon", 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 46, no. 2, 2008, pp. 413-450. 
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and more descriptive agendas in others that lacked the backing of govern-
ments and national (and regional) parliaments.18 However, Lisbon's successor, 
"Europe 2020", while putting more emphasis on innovation, green techno-
logies and social cohesion, preserved the procedures defined in 2005.19 
b. Lisbon II and Europe 2020 in practice: the main actors and processes at the EU 
level 
The "streamlined" and "improved" governance architecture of Lisbon II was 
based on two three-year cycles, the first one from 2005-2008 and the second 
one from 2008-2010. The Integrated Guidelines adopted by the Council on 
the basis of the Commissions proposal served as the starting point for the 
first cycle. On the basis of the Integrated Guidelines, Member States elaborated 
NRPs, adjusted to their specific national situation, until October 2005. As a 
counterpart, the Commission drew up a Community Lisbon Programme cov-
ering all actions to be undertaken at Community level. In each of the two the 
two following years (2006 and 2007), Member States sent an annual report 
on the implementation of the Lisbon strategy to the Commission. Before gen-
erating a new report, the European Commission bilaterally visited Member 
States in order to assess progress and to submit country-specific policy recom-
mendations to the Member States on how to improve delivery. This assessment 
built the basis for the Annual Progress Report, published by the Commission 
at the beginning of each year as part of the preparation of the Spring Council. 
Then, at its Spring summit, the European Council reviewed progress, pro-
nounced on the Commission's recommendations, and decided on necessary 
modifications of the Integrated Guidelines. In 2008, Member States were 
asked to formulate a new NRP, thereby starting the next policy cycle. 
On 26 March 2010, the European Council agreed to the European 
Commissions proposal to launch the 'Europe 2020' strategy. This strategy 
was finalized in the June 2010 European Council, which also introduced the 
concept of a "European Semester", bringing together macro-economic policy 
developments and structural reforms under Europe 2020. The "European 
Semester" is a time-window in the first half of each year, in which Member 
States reporting under the Stability and Growth Pact and reporting under the 
18. European Commission, "Lisbon Strategy Evaluation Document", op.cit. 
19. S. Borrâs - C. Radaelli, "The politics of governance architectures: creation, change and 
effects of the EU Lisbon Strategy", op.cit., p. 465. 
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Europe 2020 Strategy are aligned, and policy guidance and recommendations 
are given to Member States before national budgets are finalized.20 Thus, 
since the second half of 2010, the pre-existing policy cycle has been modified 
in order to take account of the requirements of the European Semester. 
Whilst the Commission fulfills the driving role by starting off the Semester 
with the Annual Growth Survey, the priority actions that it puts forward are 
debated in the various Council configurations, as well as in the European 
Parliament, before being adopted by the European Council. The recommen-
dations -drawing not only on the examination of the NRPs, but also of the 
Stability and Convergence Programmes- directed to the Member States at 
the suggestion of the Commission similarly form the subject of discussion 
before being ratified by the European Council.21 
At the European level, the system of governance developed around the 
NRPs relies on the close cooperation between the Council and the Com-
mission. Political guidance and authority is provided by the Council, assisted 
by four advisory committees - the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), the 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), the Employment Committee 
(EMCO) and the Social Protection Committee (SPC). These committees are 
unique in the sense that they hold a position between the Council and the 
Commission. Although these are formally preparatory committees under the 
Council, the Commission handles their Secretariats and is also a full member 
of each one. The committees are to supply opinions on request of either the 
Council or the Commission. These committees do not fit the traditional pat-
tern of the EU policy process in another respect: since the OMC is not a leg-
islative process, normally there are no Commission or Council working groups 
involved, nor any comitology committees involved in the implementation 
phase.22 
During the period 2005-2009, each October, the finalized NRP report was 
20. European Commission, "Europe 2020; A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth", Communication from the European Commission, COM(2010) 2020 final, March 
2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUnServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF. 
21. P. Heuse - H. Zimmer, "The Europe 2020 strategy", Economic Review, National Bank 
of Belgium, 2011, issue 2, Brussels 2011, pp. 30-31, http://www.nbb.be/doc/ ts/publications/ 
EconomicReview/201 l/ecorevII201 l_H2.pdf. 
22. K. Jacobsson - E. Vifell, "Deliberative Transnationalism? Analysing the Role of 
Committee Interaction in Soft Co-ordination", in C. Meyer - I. Linsenmann - W. Wessels 
(eds.), Economic Government Of The EU; A Balance Sheet of New Modes of Policy 
Coordination, Palgrave, Basingstoke and New York 2007, pp. 168-169. 
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forwarded to Brussels, where it was transmitted to the EPC. In the EPC, a two-
tier process of multilateral surveillance took place, whereby countries exam-
ined one another's NRP. This process was quite intensive and ultimately fed 
into the Commissions Annual Progress Report. The Commissions report 
contained proposals for country-specific recommendations, which served as 
the basis for a second, more targeted round of multilateral surveillance in 
January. The country-specific recommendations were then discussed in the 
EPC, the EFC and the EMCO, and were finally signed off by the ECOFIN in 
March. 
Drawing on the typology developed by Bache and Marshal,.23 the delivery 
mechanism of Lisbon II represents a policy regime of voluntary-indirect 
Europeanization: member states are being encouraged to adapt a significant 
number of their public policies to EU pressures and practices through policy 
transfer and learning. This has been reflected in the Lisbon Strategy's two spe-
cific requirements that might affect organizational features of national execu-
tives, namely, the preparations for the Spring Councils and national reform 
plans (upstream dimension of national co-ordination), and the multiannual 
programming and cyclical reporting requirements (downstream dimension of 
national co-ordination).24 This general approach was retained in the context 
of the "Europe 2020" strategy; only after the advent of the 2010 debt crisis 
would this model be seriously reconsidered.25 
3. POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS AND POLICY 
COORDINATION IN GREECE 
a. Public policy in Greece: the main traits 
Using Schmidt's typology on the nature of European democracies,26 Greece is 
a simple polity par excellence, combining a unitary state structure, a majori-
tarian system of representation and statist policy-making processes.27 The 
23.1. Bache - A. Marshall, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: A Governance 
Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain", op.cit. 
24. S. Borrâs - B. G. Peters, "The Lisbon Strategy's empowerment of core executives: cen-
tralizing and politicizing EU national co-ordination", op.cit., p. 529. 
25. See section 4.2 and the Conclusions of this article. 
26. See V. Schmidt, Democracy in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006. 
27. K. Featherstone - D. Papadimitriou, The Limits of Europeanization; Reform Capacity 
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overall context of policy-making is defined by the limited ability of state insti-
tutions to deliver reform. As Spanou put it, the Greek state has been "hyper-
trophied, omnipresent, but ultimately weak".28 The states administrative 
complex is seen as suffering from internal problems of poor co-ordination; 
excessive legalism and hierarchical control; turf-fighting; the lack of high 
quality technical personnel; the inefficient use, and often the lack, of re-
sources; clientelism and non-meritocratic norms; party infiltration; and the 
lack of permanency for senior positions. These features appear endemic to the 
administration, sustained across different governments. Hence, a) the Greek 
state has limited potential to introduce major structural reform (to liberalize 
the states economic regulation, ownership and social support)29 and b) while 
the record of institutional reform has been relatively more successful, there 
appears a serious implementation deficit.30 
Reform initiatives are also hampered by the relationship between state in-
stitutions and wider society. First, interest mediation is constrained by a 
plethora of unofficial veto points', a distortion in favour of the interests of 
the public sector and the few large private corporations, an absence of trust 
between the key actors and the weakness of a "social dialogue". Second, there 
is an absence of a relevant policy community or think-tanks to affect actor in-
terests or to offer legitimation to government reform strategies. Unavoidably, 
then, in sensitive policy sectors (such as social, employment and education 
policies), public understanding of the implications of reform (and of a failure 
to reform) is low and vulnerable to political manipulation. Third, the elec-
toral cycle constrains the priority, content and timetable for reform: the scope 
and ConHict in Greece, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2008, pp. 52-53; G. Andreou, "The 
domestic effects of EU cohesion policy in Greece: Islands of Europeanization in a sea of tradi-
tional practices", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, March 2010, p. 
14. 
28. C. Spanou, "On The Regulatory Capacity of The Hellenic State: A Tentative Approach 
Based on a Case Study", International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 62, no. 2, June 
1996, pp. 219-237. 
29. K. Featherstone, "'Soft' Co-Ordination Meets 'Hard' Politics: the European Union and 
Pension Reform in Greece", Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 
733-750; K. Featherstone - D. Papadimitnou, The Limits of Europeanization; Reform 
Capacity and Conflict in Greece, op.cit, pp. 41-45. 
30. C. Spanou - D. Sotiropoulos, "The Odyssey of Administrative Reforms in Greece, 
1981-2008: A Tale of Two Reform Paths", Public Administration, vol. 89, no. 3, 2011, 
pp.723-737. 
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for bolder reform initiatives lies early in the cycle, with softer and more limited 
reform attempts likely later in the cycle.31 
b. EU Policy coordination in Greece 
In terms of policy coordination, the most manifest systemic trait of the Greek 
state is the lack of an effective core executive or Centre of Government.32 
Right until the outbreak of the domestic debt crisis in 2010, the Prime Min-
ister's Office (PMO) was not a functional equivalent of a strategic planning 
unit, as its role was to monitor the work of ministers and follow up the evolu-
tion of government policies.33 Hence, the PMO primarily assumed an ex post 
coordination function. Key policy functions were distributed across different 
ministries and there was very little inter-ministerial and intra-ministerial co-
ordination. The administration generally used to operate in silos. Fragmentation 
and overlaps among structures and tasks discouraged co-operation; unavoid-
ably, then, collective commitment to a reform agenda was absent. Co-ordina-
tion, where it happened, was usually ad hoc, based on personal knowledge.34 
In sum, most coordination mechanisms in the Greek government are in-
formal. The PMO discusses policy proposals with ministers in ad hoc meet-
ings; individual Ministers inform one another of policy initiatives over the 
phone or in brief personal meetings; and advisers to the Prime Minister con-
fer with Ministers on policy issues when the Prime Minister selectively invites 
Ministers to the PMO headquarters for consultation. Line Ministries' higher 
civil servants are not normally involved in either the formulation or the coor-
dination of policy proposals. Most policy preparation is done by political ap-
pointees, typically pro-government academics, experts and governing party 
cadres who form the Minister's entourage. These appointees staffa unit at the 
31. K. Featherstone, "'Soft' Co-Ordination Meets 'Hard' Politics: the European Union and 
Pension Reform in Greece", op.cit., pp. 738-739; K. Featherstone - D. Papadimitriou, The 
Limits of Europeanization; Reform Capacity and Conflict in Greece, op.cit., pp. 200-201; K. 
Featherstone, "The Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis and EMU: A Failing State in a Skewed 
Regime", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 49, no. 2, 2011, pp. 195-198. 
32. For a detailed analysis, see K. Featherstone - D. Papadimitriou, "The Emperor has no 
Clothes! Power and Resources within the Greek Core Executive", Governance, vol 26, no 3 
2013, pp.523-545. 
33. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) 2011; Greece report, 
2011, p. 31, http://www.sgi-network.org/pdf/SGIll_Greece.pdf. 
34. OECD, Greece: Review of the Central Administration, op.cit., p. 17. 
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peak of each Ministry's hierarchy, called the "political bureau of the minister" 
(the functional equivalent of the French "cabinet ministerial").35 More gener-
ally, personal networks and commitment are important explanatory factors 
for successful operation and performance. The prevalence of agency over 
structure tends thus to be a permanent feature of the Greek politico-adminis-
trative system. 
When looking at the patterns of national co-ordination of EU policy, there 
are two fundamental dimensions. The first dimension is the level of central-
ization or decentralization within the executive. This has to do with the rela-
tive role attributed to core executives (or Centres of Government) vis-à-vis 
the role of sectoral ministries with traditionally high profile in EU matters 
(mostly the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Economics and Finance Ministry). 
The second dimension concerns the role of bureaucrats vis-à-vis that of 
politicians. This dimension deals with the exercise of leadership in the national 
process of co-ordination of EU matters, meaning whether this leadership is 
mostly exercised by elected politicians or by civil servants.37 
Since Greece's accession to the EU, the leading role in EU policy coordina-
tion was been oscillating between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. The former was (and still is) formally in 
charge of political and/ or high policy issues, while the latter was responsible 
for economic policy issues. In practice, however, the 'coordination ambition 
of both Ministries was low and, in many cases, line Ministries tended to ex-
hibit a high degree of autonomy.38 On top ofthat, no there were no functional 
structures for inter-ministerial EU policy coordination on a permanent basis.39 
After the government turnover of 2009, the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance was dismantled, and it was the Ministry of Finance that inherited the 
35. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) 2011; Greece report, 
op.cit, p. 35. 
36. C. Spanou, "Managing Europe from home: the Europeanization of the Greek Core 
Executive", Occasional Paper 4.1, Organising for EU Enlargement Project, 2004. http:// 
www.oeue.net/papers/greece-theeuropeanisationofthe.pdf. 
37. S. Borrâs - Β. G. Peters, "The Lisbon Strategy's empowerment of core executives: cen­
tralizing and politicizing EU national co-ordination", op.cit., p. 529-530. 
38. See C. Spanou, "Managing Europe from Home: the Europeanization of the Greek 
Core Executive", op.cit. 
39. See A. Passas - E. Petraki, "Greek Administration in the EU Policy Process", in A. Passas 
- T. Tsekos (eds.), National Administration and European Integration; the Greek Experience, 
Papazisis Publications, Athens (in Greek). 
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coordinating competences for economic policy, with the exception of the co-
ordination of EU cohesion policy (which is now a competence of the Min-
istry of Development and Competitiveness). Thus, the overall picture is one 
of decentralization (or fragmentation) coupled with a high degree of infor-
mality and fluidity. At the same time, the prevalence of politicians over bu-
reaucrats is unquestionable (one partial exception being cohesion policy, 
which is entrusted to a task-specific management network operating "outside" 
the mainstream administration).40 
Turning into intra-ministerial policy coordination, whilst most ministries 
do not possess a permanent strategic planning unit, some have acquired a 
functional equivalent. The most prominent of these is the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors (SOE), which lies in the Ministry of Finance (until 2009 in 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance). SOE falls directly under the jurisdic-
tion of the Minister of Finance.41 It has been granted an advisory role in eco-
nomic policy developments, including ECOFIN matters. More importantly, 
its president is an alternate member of both ECOFIN and Eurogroup, and its 
members represent Greece in all Council groups under ECOFIN, including 
the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), the Economic Policy Com-
mittee (EPC) and their sub-committees.42 On top ofthat, SOE is responsible 
for updating the national Stability and Growth Programmes. In 2005 SOE 
was also granted the responsibility for coordinating the drafting and the annu-
al updating of Greece's National Reform Programmes. After the Greek debt 
crisis erupted (2010), the Greek government used SOE members as advisers 
and negotiators (though not as official national representatives) in the encoun-
ters between Greece and the European Commission and in the negotiations 
with the IMF. As it will be illustrated in the next section, since the adoption of 
the "Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece", SOE is also assisting the 
Ministry of Finance in monitoring the Programmes implementation.43 
40. G. Andreou, "The domestic effects of EU cohesion policy in Greece: Islands of 
Europeanization in a sea of traditional practices", Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 
vol.10, no. 1, March 2010, pp. 13-27. 
41. SOE is composed by its president and a five-member Scientific Council, selected by the 
Minister of Finance for a 3-year term, an eight-member Economic Research and Analysis Unit 
(whose members are selected by the SOE s president also for a 3-year term) and a Secretariat. 
42. It should be noted that the Ministry of Labour, which is in charge of representing 
Greece in the Employment Council and the two Lisbon-relating committees (the Employment 
Committee and the Social Protection committee) does not possess such a unit. 
43. Interview with a SOE official, 10/5/2012. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 02:48:10 |
130 GEORGE ANDREOU 
Greek policy-makers initially viewed the OMC with mistrust and reserva-
tion. This attitude comes from the inability of a state-centered society to 
come to terms with decentralized and participation processes, the absence of 
a civil society that could claim participation and the mistrust of trade unions 
towards a -very- centralized state with no intentions of promoting a genuine 
social dialogue. Both the government and the main political forces had fa-
vored the old Community method -as it brought immediate results and was, 
at least partly, financed by EU funds.44 In the course of the last decade, Greek 
politicians and top civil servants have progressively come to terms with the 
OMC but, as various reports and evaluations testify, they have not made a very 
efficient use of it.45 A study of the response of the Greek administrative sys-
tem to the OMC in the field of pensions is particularly illustrating from an in-
stitutionalist viewpoint: it is revealed that, firstly, the OMC has not been very 
"open" (mobilizing only a small network of national civil servants and ex-
perts) and, secondly, that very little mutual learning has taken place.46 
4. THE STORY OF STRATEGIC PROGRAMMING IN GREECE, 2005-2012 
a. The 2005-2008 and 2008-2010 NRPs: An experiment in policy coordination 
The Greek "National Reform Programme for Growth and Jobs 2005-2008" 
was drawn up in accordance with the guidelines issued following the re-
launching of the Lisbon Strategy. The NRP -and the Lisbon Strategy as a 
whole- was coordinated by the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. G. 
Alogoskoufis -the first Greek "Mr. Lisbon"-, with the member of SOE and 
Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, Ms. H. Louri, as deputy coordina-
tor assisted by both SOE and the Economic Office of the Prime Minister. 
The Greek NRP started taking shape in March 2005 and was completed in 
October 2005 after having been presented and discussed at the Standing Com-
mittees on Economic and European Affairs of the Greek Parliament. At the 
44. T. Sakellaropoulos, "Greece: The Quest for National Welfare Expansion Through More 
Social Europe", in J. Kvist - J. Saari (eds.), The Europeanization of Social Protection, Polity 
Press, Bristol 2007, pp. 211-227. 
45. See, for example, S. Tilford - P. Whyte, "The Lisbon Scoreboard X; the road to 2020", 
Centre for European Reform, 2010, http://docs.minszw.nl/pdf/34/2010/34_2010J_l4l00.pdf. 
46. M. Angelaki, "Applying the Open Method of Co-ordination back home: The case of 
Greek pension policy", Social Cohesion and Development, vol. 2, no. 2, 2007, pp. 129-138. 
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same time, the Economic and Social Committee (OKE) -an advisory body 
established in 1994 in the mould of the Economic and Social Committee of 
the EU- established an "Observatory for the Monitoring of Lisbon Strategy 
and Sustainable Development Policies", whose aim was to monitor the evolu-
tion of the reform process at the national level and to produce reports on an 
annual or bi-annual basis.47 
In practice, the responsibility for the set-up and the operation of the coor-
dination network was taken over by SOE, which established contact points 
with the line Ministries involved, organized a drafting procedure for the NRP 
(whereby each Ministry had to submit its own contribution within a specific 
deadline), carried out a series of consultation meetings involving the Min-
istries, regional authorities, Social Partners and NGOs and, after the Pro-
gramme's submission in the EU, represented Greece in the multilateral sur-
veillance processes in the framework of the EPC and the EFC.48 The driving 
force behind all this was the Lisbon's deputy coordinator, who, being a close 
partner of both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Economy and 
Finance, was able to "persuade" the line Ministries to cooperate in an effective 
and timely manner.49 In any case, all participants recognized that the new 
model of cooperation was constructive, and this assessment was reflected in 
the Commission's first annual assessment of the Greek NRP.50 
The coordination network established in 2005 remained active throughout 
the duration of the first NRP. A noteworthy development was the creation of 
a Standing Lisbon Committee consisting of the competent Ministries, the 
Social Partners, the regions and NGOs. The establishment of this committee 
could possibly be considered as "best practice"51 and its prestige -was well as 
47. Interview with an OKE official, 7/5/2012; Hellenic Republic - Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, "National Reform Programme for Growth and Jobs 2005-2008", Athens, Octo-
ber 2005, http://www3.mnec.gr/LISBON-NRP_EN_01-12-2005.pdf. 
48. An interesting finding is that the Ministry of Labour was never able to take advantage 
of its strong institutional position at the EU level (being in charge of representing Greece in 
both EMCO and EPC). As a result, the dominant role of the Ministry of Finance (and SOE) has 
been never questioned. 
49. Interview with a former SOE official, 24/5/2012. 
50. European Commission, "Communication from The Commission to the Spring Euro-
pean Council; Time To Move Up A Gear - Country Chapters", Brussels, Part II to COM 
(2006)30, Brussels, January 2006, pp. 68-72, http://www.bmwf.gv.at/fileadminuser_upload/ 
europa/lissabon/forschung_lissabon_fs2.pdf. 
51. Hellenic Republic - Ministry of Economy and Finance, "National Reform Programme 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 02:48:10 |
132 GEORGE ANDREOU 
its members' commitment- was certainly enhanced by the Commissions ini-
tiative to introduce yearly meetings in Athens.52 Moreover, OKE's Lisbon 
Observatory expanded its activities by undertaking information communica-
tion initiatives with a wider range of stakeholders and citizens.53 Finally, the 
Federation of Greek Industries (SEV) started a systematic monitoring of the 
NRP s implementation.54 Thus, in its following assessments, the Commission 
continued to view the governance of the Greek NRPs in a favourable light, 
stating though that "more work is needed to step up cooperation between 
central, regional and local level".55 
Both the network around SOE and the Lisbon Committee retained an in-
formal character, a fact that signified that their performance and survival de-
pended largely on a) the level of commitment on behalf of SOE and b) the 
level of political backing that the latter was enjoying. These limitations be-
came evident when Ms. Louri quit early in 2008 and the post of deputy coor-
dinator remained vacant for several months. Inter-ministerial coordination 
became then more difficult (since no other SOE member enjoyed the political 
backing of the former deputy coordinator). Overall, though, the NRP coordi-
nation mechanism remained functional throughout 2008 (when the 2008-
2010 NRP was prepared) and 2009 (when the first annual implementation re-
port for 2008-2010 was issued under a new government).56 On the other 
hand, OKE's Lisbon Observatory suspended its activities due to internal dis-
sensions.57 
for Growth and Jobs 2008-2010", Athens, October2008, pp. 5-6, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
archives/growthandjobs_2009/pdf/member-states-2008-2010reports/greece_nrp_2008_en.pdf. 
52. Interview with a former SOE official, 15/6/2012.See also Hellenic Republic - Ministry 
of Economy and Finance, "National Reform Programme for Growth and Jobs 2005-2008; 
Implementation Report 2006", Athens, October 2006, p. 3, http://ec.europa.eu/archives 
/growthandjobs/pdf/nrp/EL_nrp_en.pdf. 
53. Interview with an OKE official, 7/5/2012. 
54. See the relevant webpage of SEV (in Greek), http://www.sev.org.gr /online/viewPos.as-
px?cat=6&mid757&lang=gr&Code=Opinions. 
55. European Commission, "Implementing The Renewed Lisbon Strategy For Growth 
And Jobs: A Year Of Delivery", Brussels, Part II to COM(2006) 816 final, Brussels, 2006, p. 2, 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs/pdf/ 1206_annual_report_greece_en. pdf. 
56. Interview with a former SOE official, 24/5/2012. 
57. Interview with an OKE official, 7/5/2012. It is noteworthy that in the -still available-
webpage of the Observatory, the latter is has been retitled "Observatory of Sustainable Devel-
opment Policies" (i.e. any direct reference to 'Lisbon' has been deleted). 
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b. The 2011-2014 NRP: Greece in the "Memorandum era" 
In late 2009, a very serious sovereign debt crisis erupted in Greece. Unable to 
confront the problem, the Greek government was forced in April 2010 to ask 
bilateral financial assistance from Euro-area Member States and a Stand-By 
Arrangement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result, in 
May 2010 the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the IMF agreed on a three-year financing package for a total amount of EUR 
110 billion (loan commitments). This loan agreement was accompanied by a 
very strict conditionality identified in an ambitious "economic adjustment 
programme for Greece". The specific conditions for the release of loan in-
stallments on a quarterly basis were further detailed in a "Memorandum of 
Understanding" agreed with the Greek authorities. The adjustment pro-
gramme foresaw comprehensive action on three fronts: (i) a fiscal consolida-
tion strategy, supported by structural fiscal measures and better fiscal control; 
(ii) structural reforms in the labour and product markets to address competi-
tiveness and growth; and (iii) efforts to safeguard banking system stability. 
This strategy was further specified in a very long list of reform measures -en-
compassing virtually all policy sectors- that were to be adopted and imple-
mented by the Greek authorities according to a very strict timetable. Greece's 
progress at all fronts would be assessed on a quarterly basis by a joint mission 
of the ECB, the EC and the IMF -the infamous Troika. The transfer of each 
tranche of the loan was to be dependent on such scrutiny.58 
The change brought about by the adoption of the Memorandum has been 
seismic for the politico-administrative system of Greece as a whole. Henceforth, 
the financial viability of the Greek state depends on the implementation of a 
very precise and demanding policy programme that has been largely imposed 
by Greece's creditors and that can be modified only with the consent of the 
EU and the IMF. On top ofthat, the strict conditionality of the Memorandum is 
incompatible with the logic of Europe 2020: the ex ante definition of specific 
policy priorities and detailed, sequenced and quantified policy measures leaves 
no room for policy discretion (not to mention experimentation). In this new 
policy environment, the government and the public administration were 
obliged to adjust their reform priorities and initiatives to the needs and the 
58. See, among others, European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper; Assess-
ment of the 2011 National Reform Programme and Stability Programme for Greece", SEC 
(2011)717 final, Brussels 2011. 
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austerity logic of the adjustment programme. In practice, this means that the 
activities of almost every Ministry are being monitored by Troika officials on 
a quarterly basis, an obligation that represents a huge workload for those 
-few- civil servants or advisers that are in position to meet the Troikas re-
quirements for policy information. In many cases, these persons were also in-
volved in the NRP network, and were requested by SOE to provide their con-
tributions in view of the 2011-2014 NRP.59 
Under these conditions, most of the domestic policy actors participating 
in the NRP network became convinced that the NRP was becoming a 'luxury 
or a 'meaningless exercise. Thus, the participation of line Ministries in the 
drafting of the 2011-2014 NRP was minimal and the Lisbon Committee was 
not convened at all.60 As to the NPR itself, it was essentially repeating Greece's 
commitments contained in the adjustment programme and, in terms of con-
tent, it largely overlapped with the 2011-2014 Stability and Growth Program-
me. Accordingly, Greece's participation in the multilateral surveillance process 
was typical, as was the 2011 annual Council recommendations -in fact, a sin-
gle recommendation, that is to "fully implement" the measures of the adjust-
ment programme.61 Similar recommendations were made to Ireland and Po-
rtugal, the two other Eurozone members that had followed Greece into re-
ceiving financial assistance by the EU and the IMF and, in exchange, had 
adopted their own Memoranda; for the record, the adverb "fully" did not ap-
pear in the Irish and Portuguese texts.62 Taken together, the Council recom-
mendations for Greece, Ireland and Portugal represent a turning point for 
"Europe 2020". In their effort to salvage the EMU policy regime, EU policy-
makers have acknowledged that the overall reform strategy of voluntary-indi-
rect Europeanization is no longer appropriate for those member states that are 
59. Interview with a former SOE official, 24/5/2012. 
60. Ibid. 
61. See Council of the EU, "Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the National 
Reform Programme 2011 of Greece", Brussels 2011/C 213/04, July 2011, http://eur-lex. 
europa. eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:213:0012:0013:EN:PDF. 
62. See Council of the EU, "Council Recommendation of 12 July 201 Ion the National 
Reform Programme 2011 of Ireland and delivering a Council opinion on the updated Stability 
Programme of Ireland, 2011-2015", 2011/C 215/01, July 2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:215:0001:0003:EN:PDF; Council of the EU, 
"Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 on the National Reform Programme 2011 of 
Portugal, 2011/C 216/01, July 2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex UriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2011:216:0001:0002:EN:PDF. 
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unable to sustain the economic crisis by their own means. Instead, these 
second-rank members must focus on the strict conditionality of the 
Memoranda and the coercive-direct Europeanization it represents. In short, a 
two-speed "Europe 2020" has emerged. 
Since 2010, Greece's reform agenda is being defined and scrutinized ac-
cording to the provisions and revisions of the economic adjustment pro-
grammes. This process relies on a hierarchical and centralized approach to 
governance, with the Ministry of Finance being in charge of policy coordina-
tion. In institutional and procedural terms, reform priorities, actions and inter-
dependencies are being specified, discussed and assessed on the basis of quar-
terly monitoring meetings of national representatives with representatives of 
the Troika. These meetings take place at three levels (technical, ministerial and 
central). At the technical level, members of the technical staff of the troika 
meet with the General Secretaries of each Ministry involved. Once technical 
issues are clarified, there are negotiations at ministerial level between the mem-
bers of the Troika and the Ministers of each Ministry involved. The top-level 
negotiations take place between the members of the Troika, the Minister of 
Finance and the Minister or Ministers involved (if necessary). Again, SOE 
members are present in all meetings, though not as official negotiators; their 
task is to monitor developments and to inform the Minister of Finance. The 
significance of SOE as a source of expertise is highlighted by the fact that its 
president participates in all top-level meetings, assisting the Minister of 
Finance.63 
Last but not least, the successive Greek governments that have assumed the 
task of implementing the economic adjustment programme have so far been 
reluctant to create any permanent policy coordination structure. This lapse is 
all the more remarkable, given that the modernization of public administra-
tion is one of the key goals of the programme and that the creation of a stable 
structure of inter-ministerial coordination holds a prominent place in the cur-
rent administrative reform plans.64 Therefore, coordinating the implementa-
tion of the Memorandum still relies on pre-existing structures: the Ministry 
of Finance holds the general responsibility; important tasks are shared be-
63. Interviewwith a SOE official, 15/2/2013. 
64. The legal framework for inter-ministerial coordination was adopted only in December 
2012; at the time of writing, the operational implementation of the coordination is still to 
start. See European Commission - Task Force for Greece, 'Fourth Quarterly Report', April 
2013, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-20l4/president/pdf/qr4_en.pdf. 
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tween SOE and key Ministry services (primarily the General Directorate of 
Economic Policy);65 and the PMO is limited in monitoring developments.66 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this paper confirm the hypothesis that the establishment of 
the NRPs would enhance politicization: the main coordination tasks were en-
trusted to political appointees who were directly accountable to their political 
superiors. However, it is harder to pronounce on the hypothesis that more 
centralization would occur. Officially, the role of "Mr. Lisbon" was handed 
over to the Minister of Economy and Finance (and later the Minister of 
Finance) and not to the PMO. Yet, in reality the overall responsibility was taken 
over by the deputy Lisbon coordinator -a top-level adviser that was both a 
SOE member (i.e., directly accountable to the Minister of Economy and 
Finance) and the Director of the Economic Office of the Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, all major co-ordination tasks were entrusted to SOE members 
and the PMO did not play any active role in the whole process. There appears 
thus to have been a tacit agreement between the PMO and the Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance that "Lisbon" would remain under the authority of the 
latter, while the former would exercise solely a supervisory function. Once 
again, the limitations of the Greek core executive (or Centre of Government) 
are becoming evident. 
More importantly, evidence supports also the hypothesis that, in dealing 
with Lisbon Strategy matters, the Greek executive would introduce path-de-
pendent changes reflecting a continuation of pre-existing institutional pat-
terns. The policy pattern adopted for the coordination of the NRPs followed 
closely the pre-existing model of economic policy coordination. SOE, a pre-
existing, well-performing (by domestic standards) and "Europeanized" agency, 
was entrusted with the mission to carry out both the drafting of the NRP and 
Greece's representation in the monitoring procedures that were developed at 
65. In late 2012, a" Special Service for the Monitoring of the Memorandum" was set up in 
the Ministry of Finance after much delay (its creation was proclaimed in the Memorandum it-
self). 
66. Interview with a SOE official, 15/2/2013. On the other hand, it is highly plausible to as-
sume that, since 2010, there have been many fluctuations in the unofficial balance of power be-
tween three different Prime Ministers and Ministers of Finance. 
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the EU level. The initial success of this arrangement must be attributed: a) to 
the skills, personality, commitment and political clout of SOE's members 
-and of the deputy Lisbon coordinator in particular; and b) to the informal 
character of the whole scheme: as the creation of the NRP network was ac-
companied by no visible change in the inter-ministerial balance of power, it 
was acceptable to all major players.67 
The very informality of the Greek NRP network marked also the limits of 
its success, as lack of institutionalization meant that it would be very vulner-
able to change. To be fair, the change brought about by the adoption of the 
Memorandum made the survival of the network all but impossible. In the 
"Memorandum era", the coordination ambition of the Greek executive is 
-understandably- exhausted in successfully addressing the demands of the 
Troika on a quarterly basis, relying on path-dependent institutional patterns. 
What is perhaps less understandable is the readiness of Greece's EU partners 
(above all the Commission) to abandon completely the "soft coordination" 
logic of the Greek, Irish and Portuguese NRPs by subsuming their monitoring 
and implementation into the conditionality of the respective adjustment pro-
grammes. Firstly, this choice is conceptually flawed, since not all components 
of a NRP feed into the relevant adjustment programme.68 Secondly, resorting 
to hierarchy and centralization may be an appropriate method for pursuing 
fiscal consolidation, but is certainly far less effective for the purpose of struc-
tural reform. Lastly, the creation of a two-speed "Europe 2020" deals a severe 
blow to the coherence and credibility of the Lisbon governance architecture 
as a whole. This setback may produce serious disincentives for coordinated 
reform in the EU (unless of course a functional alternative of "Europe 2020" 
is developed). 
67. Interview with a former SOE official, 24/5/2012 
68. Interview with a SOE official, 15/2/2013. 
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